ph salsel: normallemmon
1 There exists a structural homology between the outside (dehors), of which Maurice Blanchot speaks — an outside that is inside instead of merely being outward—and with him Michel Foucault in "La pensée du dehors" (1966) and Gilles Deleuze for example in "Critique et Clinique" (1993) and that what by Jacques Lacan is called the Real, which persists amidst the (homogeneous, pseudo-consistent) reality.
2 The persistence of the real, the outside or the chaos and Dionysian non-ground (in the thinking of Nietzsche and Deleuze & Guattari) is not only a fundamental problem in contemporary philosophy.
3 There is no thinking that is not touched by this exterior — touched and initiated, animated and seduced, activated and made insecure — so that it must admit to its inconsistency, an admission that one can simply call thinking because thinking about thinking belongs to thinking; the self-mediation with its constitutive impotence and contingency.
4 That is why I am interested in the role of animals and children, the untamed element, in the philosophical and literary text (we presume what cannot be presumed, namely that we can differentiate between the two).
5 I think — but these are only examples — about Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Derrida.
6 In the first section of "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" (1873), Nietzsche writes: “What, indeed, does man know of himself! Can he even once perceive himself completely, laid out as if in an illuminated glass case? Does not nature keep much the most from him, even about his body, to spellbind and confine him in a proud, deceptive consciousness, far from the coils of the intestines, the quick current of the blood stream, and the involved tremors of the fibbers? She threw away the key; and woe to the calamitous curiosity which might peer just once through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and look down, and sense that man rests upon the merciless, the greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, in the indifference of his ignorance—hanging in dreams, as it were, upon the back of a tiger. In view of this, whence in all the world comes the urge for truth?”
7 The human subject rest on the fleeing back of a tiger; it hardly knows that this is the case because it is so tightly wound up in its illusion of autonomy — the notion of being the self-conscious agent of his acts and judgements.
8 That is his elementary narcissism that is supposed to protect him from elementary forces by confining him in a cage of consciousness that makes him believe there is no beyond of consciousness, at least no beyond of self-consciousness, no exterior of this ideology based on this interiority phantasm.
9 Wittgenstein’ thinking is also populated by myriad animals.
10 What is the function of the animal in the Wittgensteinian text?
11 What do the animals of animality stand for?
12. Why does Wittgenstein say in a central passage of "Culture and Value", that “within all great art there is a WILD animal: tamed”?
13. Why does his discourse, here and elsewhere, evoke the image of untamed nature?
14 Because the discourse, to use this word that was alien to him, must come into direct contact with its inherent alienness to the extent that language game and life form are in fact constructs or levels of consistency arbitrarily spanned over the abyss of inconsistency.
15 And even Derrida affirms the role of the untamed in the act of reading, writing and thinking in an interview on his book "Glas" (1974) in which imagines himself on the back of a wild horse, which Kafka and Wittgenstein incidentally do as well: “‘I’m afraid”: this is never me exactly, nor is the fear mine exactly ... Fear because the horse I am straddling – the text – the textual force on which I am mounted must be stronger than me, must not let itself be dominated, broken, or mastered by the bit that it has or that I put or that I take in its mouth. Otherwise, it’s not interesting.”
16 Not interesting: boring, beyond every possible experience, thus beyond an experiri that leads the subject beyond himself into the unknown.
17 Is it possible to imagine art and philosophy without the carefreeness of children and the wildness of the zone called nature and its boisterous inhabitants, which we call animals?